Abstract: What are the effects of increased trade in goods and services on the trade balance? We study the effects of reducing transport costs in a Ricardian model with complete asset markets and find that this increases the volatility of the trade balance. This result applies regardless of whether supply or demand shocks are the main source of economic fluctuations. Both type of shocks generate fluctuations in the trade balance that are in part moderated by stabilizing movements in the terms of trade. Trade integration dampens these terms of trade movements and, for a given distribution of shocks, amplifies fluctuations in the trade balance. To overturn this result, one must assume that either trade integration is sufficiently biased towards goods with strong comparative advantage and/or risk aversion is sufficiently extreme. We calibrate the model to U.S. data and find that, for reasonable parameter values, increased trade in services could double the volatility of the trade balance.
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In the last thirty years, the volume of trade among industrial countries has more than tripled. During this same period, trade imbalances among these countries have grown larger and more volatile. It is natural to ask whether there is a connection between these two developments and, in particular, whether they are both driven by the same set of economic forces. Many have argued that the increased volume of trade is due to a reduction in the technological and policy-induced costs of trading goods and services.
1 Is it possible that these cost reductions are also responsible for the increase in the size and volatility of trade imbalances? If so, what are the main theoretical channels through which this happens? Are these channels quantitatively important?
Unfortunately, there is little in the form of received "wisdom" that can help us answer these questions. 2 This state of affairs reflects in part the absence of a simple workhorse model incorporating the main insights of the theories of goods and asset trade and the key interactions between them. This paper attempts to fill this gap. Our strategy is to build from the classic continuum model of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson [1977] and add asset markets to it. To motivate trade in goods and services, we assume countries have different industry technologies. To motivate trade in assets, we assume countries experience imperfectly correlated shocks to technology (or "supply") and to preferences (or "demand"). As usual, we assume that some goods can be traded at negligible transport costs (the "traded" sector), while the rest can only be traded at prohibitively high transport costs (the "nontraded" sector).
We interpret the process of trade integration as one in which some nontraded goods become traded.
The main theoretical result of this paper is that trade integration increases the volatility of the trade balance. This result applies regardless of whether supply or 1 Baier and Bergstrand (2001) find that about 31 to 45 percent of the increase in the volume of trade can be explained by reductions in costs of trading goods and services. Of this total, tariff rate reductions and preferential agreements account for 23 to 26 percent, and transport cost declines for 8 to 9 percent. We think that these are very conservative estimates and the real numbers might be even higher. 2 A remarkable exception is Cole and Obstfeld [1991] , who provide an example in which a drastic reduction (from prohibitive to negligible) in the costs of trading all goods and services has no effect on the trade balance. As we shall see later, their model obtains as a special case of ours.
demand shocks are the main source of economic fluctuations. Both type of shocks generate fluctuations in the trade balance that are in part moderated by stabilizing movements in the terms of trade. Trade integration dampens these terms of trade movements and, for a given distribution of shocks, amplifies fluctuations in the trade balance. To overturn this result is not easy in our framework, but it can be done in two cases. The first one requires that trade integration be sufficiently biased towards goods with strong comparative advantage. By this we mean that the newly-traded goods must exhibit cross-country differences in productivity that are 'large' relative to those of existing traded goods. The second case requires that risk aversion be sufficiently extreme. That is, preferences must exhibit a coefficient of relative risk aversion that is either 'large' or 'small' relative to the logarithmic benchmark.
However, these two exceptions are not likely to be empirically relevant.
Why does trade integration increase the effects of supply shocks on the trade balance? Economy-wide fluctuations in labour productivity lead to fluctuations in the production of each good and also in the range of traded goods produced by the country. When the traded sector is small, shocks that raise labour productivity primarily raise the production of goods already produced in the country, and this lowers their prices and worsens the terms of trade. This in turn moderates the increase in income and the trade surplus created by the shock. Similarly, shocks that lower labour productivity improve the terms of trade, moderating the resulting trade deficit. When the traded sector is large, shocks to labour productivity are mostly reflected in fluctuations in the range of goods produced at home, with only small effects on their prices and the terms of trade. By increasing the size of the traded sector, trade integration decreases the effects of supply shocks on the terms of trade and so raises the volatility of the trade balance.
Why does trade integration reduce the effects of demand shocks on the trade balance? The intuition is simple and is based on the classic analysis of the transfer problem. In the presence of transport costs, there is a home bias in consumption since domestic goods are cheaper at home than abroad. Under these conditions, shocks that increase spending re-direct demand towards domestic goods and improve the terms of trade. This raises income and finances in part the increase in spending, moderating the trade deficit. Through the same mechanism, shocks that reduce spending worsen the terms of trade, moderating the trade surplus. By weakening the home bias in consumption, trade integration lessens the effects of demand shocks on the terms of trade and raises the volatility of the trade balance. Countries trade in goods to exploit differences in the technology used to produce intermediates. The extent to which they are able to do so depends on the costs of trading these intermediates. In particular, we assume that a fraction τ of the intermediates can be transported across countries without cost. We refer to these intermediates as the traded sector and assign them a low index, z∈ [0,τ] . The rest of the intermediates cannot be transported across countries and we refer to them as the nontraded sector, z∈ (τ,1] . We shall interpret changes in the equilibrium as τ increases as the effects of trade integration.
Countries trade in assets to insure against risks. At the beginning of the period, countries are uncertain about their labour productivity and their taste for consumption. As usual, we assume that they know the true probability distribution of these variables, but not their realizations. In particular, we assume that there are S 4 It is not difficult to write a multi-period version of this model. But there is little point in doing so, since we assume throughout that international financial markets are complete and factors of production are nonreproducible. Under the standard assumptions that shocks are independent and identically distributed, and both countries have 'ex-ante' identical time-separable and homothetic preferences, there is no incentive to engage in intertemporal trade and the multi-period model is equivalent to a sequence of oneperiod models.
states of nature, indexed by s=1,…,S; and assign state s a probability π s . Since countries are risk-averse, they have an incentive to share risks before the state of nature is revealed. We rule out frictions in financial markets and allow countries to freely trade a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities.
Firms, Technology and The Labour Market
Each country contains many competitive firms that produce the final good and intermediates. In the final good sector, firms use a symmetric Cobb-Douglas technology that requires the use of all intermediates. We shall see later that consumption is strictly positive in all countries and states of nature. Since the final good is nontraded, this means that the production of the final good is also strictly positive in all countries and states of nature. Therefore, the prices of the final good in
Home and Foreign, P s and P s *, are given by: , respectively. We assume labour productivity varies across countries and states of nature in a way that is captured by the indexes f s and f s *. We shall refer to variation in f s and f s * as technology or supply shocks. This is the first source of uncertainty in this model. We assume that unit labour requirements vary across intermediates and across countries in a way that is captured by the technology schedules a(z) and a*(z).
Given our assumptions about the technology used to produce the final good, all intermediates are produced in equilibrium. To determine where the traded intermediates are produced, it is useful to order them using the rule that z≤z' if and the good for which costs of production in Home and Foreign are the same:
The prices of traded intermediates are the same in both countries and can be written as follows: (5) and goods trade as a function of the world distribution of spending. To complete the model, we therefore need a consumption side for the model. Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson [1977] assumed that Home's shares of world labour income and spending differ at most by an exogenously given transfer or trade balance. This modeling strategy permitted an illuminating analysis of the economic effects of war reparations.
After World Wars I and II, cross-border financial transactions were severely restricted and the transfers imposed on the defeated countries were determined mainly by political factors. But this does not seem to be the appropriate modeling strategy today, when a sophisticated international financial market exists in which countries can buy and sell a large array of securities. Recognizing this change in the economic environment, we next provide a market-based theory of the determinants of the transfers or trade balances.
Preferences and Asset Markets
Each country contains a representative consumer that maximizes the following utility function: Representative consumers obtain income by inelastically supplying a labour endowment equal to L and L*. Therefore, their income is equal to the wage times the labour endowment, and their budget constraints can be written as follows:
where Q s is the price of the Arrow-Debreu security that delivers one unit of income in state s. These constraints simply state that the total (across states of nature) value of consumption cannot exceed the total value of income. Naturally, in each state the values of income and consumption need not be equal. Maximizing (6) subject to (7) we obtain:
Equation (8) describes how consumers distribute their spending across states of nature. The share of spending is higher in states of nature that are more likely (higher π s ) and consumption yields higher utility (higher d s ). The relationship between spending and the price of consumption (Q s ⋅P s ) is ambiguous. On the one hand, consumers want to achieve the highest possible amount of total consumption. To attain this objective they should spend more on those states in which the consumption good is cheap. On the other hand, consumers are risk averse and want to distribute their total consumption as evenly as possible across states of nature. To attain this objective they should spend more on those states in which consumption is expensive. As usual, the first consideration dominates if risk aversion is low, γ<1, while the second consideration dominates if risk aversion is high, γ>1. In the magical case of logarithmic preferences, γ=1, the two effects cancel and the distribution of spending is not affected by the price of consumption.
Equilibrium in international financial markets requires that the world value of consumption equals the world value of income in each state of nature:
Equations (8) and (9) implicitly define the distribution of consumption and the prices of all Arrow-Debreu securities as a function of the world distribution of labour income and price levels.
This completes the presentation of the model. Equations (1)- (5) and (8)- (9) describe the solution of the model up to a choice of numeraire. For a given distribution of spending, the production side of the model (as described by Equations (1)- (5)) determines the world distribution of labour income, price levels and the pattern of goods trade. For a given world distribution of labour income and price levels, the consumption side of the model (as described by Equations (8)- (9) ).
Assumption A1 simply states that countries have the same size and normalizes it to one. Assumption A2 centers the relative technology schedule at 0.5⋅τ and forces (log) productivity differences to be symmetric. This can be understood as saying that no country has a superior technology on average. By writing the technology schedule as an explicit function of the size of the traded sector, i.e. A(.;τ), we recognize that its shape depends not only on our technology assumptions, i.e. a(z) and a*(z); but also on how we distribute goods between traded and nontraded sectors. Assumption A3 says that both countries face the same distribution of shocks.
Note that this distribution is defined in terms of relative shocks as opposed to absolute shocks. This is in anticipation of the finding that only relative shocks can generate fluctuations in the trade balance and the terms of trade. Together, these three assumptions ensure that the two countries are symmetric and this simplifies the algebra of the problem substantially.
An implication of assumptions A1-A3 is that both countries have the same real
. In this particular case, Equations (8)- (9) (10) Using this notation, we can now rewrite Equation (5) to obtain:
This definition is not devoid of some ambiguity, since there is no reason for the distribution of unit labour requirements of the marginal traded goods to always be uniformly more or uniformly less dispersed than that of existing traded goods. For instance, if trade integration is biased towards goods that exhibit either very strong or very weak comparative advantage, the distribution of unit labour requirements of the marginal traded goods has more mass both in the tails and around the mean than that of existing traded goods. In this case, the rotation of the xs schedule is counter-clockwise near the middle, but clockwise in the extremes. Obviously, more complicated shifts are also possible. To eliminate any ambiguity, we assume from now on that the distribution of unit labour requirements of the marginal traded goods is either uniformly more or uniformly less dispersed than that of existing traded goods. It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the general case.
The left-hand side of Equation (11) is Home's share of world labour income or production, while the right-hand side is world spending on Home produced goods.
Equation (11) implicitly defines the equilibrium value of ω s . Since Home's trade balance as a share of world income, t s , is the difference between exports, τ⋅x s ⋅(1-e s ), and imports, τ⋅(1-x s )⋅e s , we can write:
We shall next use Equations (11)- (12) to study the cyclical behavior of the trade balance and the effects of trade integration. To streamline the discussion, in sections 2.1 and 2.2 we assume that fluctuations in the terms of trade have no effect on spending. That is, we restrict the analysis to the logarithmic case in which γ=1.
This restriction leads to a clean description of the effects of trade integration on the trade balance. In section 2.3, we examine the consequences of removing this restriction.
The Cyclical Behavior of the Trade Balance
In this world economy, countries use asset markets ex-ante to transfer income to those states of nature in which their labour productivity is low and the value of consumption is high. The trade balance records the transfers between countries that are made ex-post. In general, the nature of these transfers depends on the distribution of shocks and their effects. To isolate the main forces at work, we study next two polar examples where all the shocks are of the same type. Equation (12). The equilibrium value for ω s is obtained by crossing the AS and AD schedules, while the equilibrium value for t s is obtained by projecting the equilibrium value for ω s to the TB schedule.
The story depicted in the top panel of Figure 2 is quite standard. Home uses asset markets to purchase income in the low state and finances this by selling income in the high state. By running a trade surplus in the high state and a trade deficit in the low state, Home is able to achieve the same spending in both states despite the fluctuations in labour income. The size of the trade balances that are required to achieve this depends on the effects of productivity gains on the terms of trade, i.e. on the slope of the AD schedule. When Home's productivity is high, its terms of trade deteriorate moderating the increase in Home's share of world labour income and lowering the required trade surplus. Naturally, the opposite applies when Home's productivity is low. If these movements in the terms of trade are strong, trade balances are small in absolute value. and δ>1. Once again, we refer to these as the high and low states. The AD schedule shifts across states because, ceteris paribus, the larger is Home's share of world spending the higher is the demand for Home nontraded goods. The TB schedule also shifts because, ceteris paribus, the larger is Home's share of world spending the lower is the demand for Home exports and the higher is the demand for Home imports.
The story depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2 is also quite standard.
Home uses asset markets to purchase income in the high state and finances this by selling income in the low state. By running a trade deficit in the high state and a trade surplus in the low state, Home is able to spend more when the value of consumption is high. The size of the trade balances that are required to achieve this depends on the effects of increases in spending on the terms of trade, i.e. on both the shift and the slope of the AD schedule. When Home spending is high, its terms of trade improve, raising Home's share of world labour income and lowering the required trade deficit. Of course, the opposite applies when Home spending is low. Once again, we find that if movements in the terms of trade are strong, trade balances are small in absolute value.
The intuitions developed in these two polar examples carry almost directly to the general case with many states of nature and with some of these states involving a mixture of supply and demand shocks. We shall not pursue this point further though.
Instead, we build on these intuitions to address the main question of this paper: how does trade integration change the cyclical behavior of the trade balance?
The Effects of Trade Integration
We have seen that supply and demand shocks generate fluctuations in the trade balance that are moderated in part by stabilizing movements in the terms of trade. Next, we show how trade integration dampens these terms of trade movements and, for a given distribution of shocks, this amplifies fluctuations in the trade balance.
To see this, apply the implicit function theorem to Equations (11)- (12) with γ=1 to obtain: has different sign and is larger in absolute value than τ s t .
from prohibitive to negligible, without placing any restrictions on the characteristics of these goods. An alternative way to model trade integration is to assume the same transport cost for all goods and consider a small reduction in this cost. In this case, at high transport costs only goods with strong comparative advantage are traded. As transport costs fall goods with weaker comparative advantage start to be traded as well. In this alternative model, trade integration is always biased towards goods in which comparative advantage is weak.
Spending and the Terms of Trade
We now return to the more general case in which changes in the terms of trade affect spending. That is, we remove the restriction that γ=1. As will become apparent shortly, it is not possible to derive general results on the effects of trade integration on the trade balance. However, a detailed examination of the two polar cases of section 2.1 allows us to derive useful intuitions. To simplify matters, we assume throughout this section that trade integration is unbiased, i.e. 
An Application to Trade in Services
Our objective in this section is to develop a sense of the quantitative importance of the effects of trade integration on the trade balance. To achieve this goal, we calibrate the model and use it to study the effects of an increase in the tradeability of services. 11 While further trade integration is likely to occur in many different industries, we think that the example of services is particularly interesting given the glaring mismatch between the share of services in production and their share in international trade. In industrial countries, the service sector accounts for almost 70 percent of value added but only 20 percent of exports and imports. To a large extent, this bias in trade flows is the result of both technological and policyinduced barriers to trade in services. There are signs however that this is likely to change in the near future.
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We interpret the two-country model in section 1 as describing the United States (Home) and the rest of the O.E.C.D. countries (Foreign) . We calibrate the model using available data and then consider two scenarios. In the first one, we increase the share of traded goods in services to half of that observed in the rest of the economy. In the second one, we increase the share of traded goods in services to that observed in the rest of the economy.
Calibration
To calibrate the model, we need three pieces of information: (1) the size of the traded sector; (2) the relative technology schedule; and (3) the distribution of shocks.
11 Throughout this section, we will use the term services to refer to transportation, communication, utilities, wholesale and retail trade, FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate), and other services (notably health, education, and other professional services). 12 As the textbook example of haircuts suggests, many services are inherently more difficult to transport than manufactures and commodities. Services also tend to be more vulnerable to a wide variety of nontariff barriers to trade, such as professional licensing requirements that discriminate against foreigners, domestic content requirements in public procurement, or poor protection of intellectual property rights. But this seems to be changing rapidly. The last decade has brought a series of technological improvements that are making many services increasingly tradeable. As a result of advances in telecommunications technology, outsourcing abroad of computer programming, data entry, and call center services is becoming common practice. With the appearance of e-commerce, wholesale/retail sales and brokerage services can now be offered worldwide online. And the development of new software has raised the ability of architectural, engineering and other types of consulting firms to better interact around the globe. But this is not all. Recent multilateral negotiations under the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services have made substantial progress towards dismantling a wide array of policy-induced barriers to trade in services. The harmonization of rules and regulations within the European Union has also contributed to this process.
For reasons of data availability, we choose 1997 as the reference year, and we discuss how to obtain each of these three items in turn.
Item 1. The size of the traded sector: In all industries, some goods are traded while others are not. Our objective here is to determine the size of the traded sector for the economy as a whole, and at the industry level. We do so by taking seriously the theoretical implication that every traded good is produced either at home or abroad. Define X and M as overall U.S. exports and imports, and let v be the share of sectors and find that the share of traded goods, τ, is roughly 10 percent.
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To obtain the size of the traded sector industry-by-industry, we repeat the procedure using data on G, X and M for 33 3-digit industries spanning the entire economy. The first column of Table 1 reports the share of tradeables in gross output or production by industry. There are substantial differences in the share of traded goods across industries. In services, which account for 62 percent of production, tradeables represent only 3 percent of production. In the rest of the economy (primarily manufacturing which accounts for 28 percent of production), tradeables represent 22 percent of production.
13 Note that we are expressing tradeables as a fraction of production, rather than value added. For the U.S., the share of exports plus imports in value added in 1997 is 0.23.
Item 2. The relative technology schedule: We calibrate differences in industry technologies to match data on trade in goods and services. 14 To do so we need to impose some additional structure on the data. In particular, we treat the distribution of relative productivities within each of the 33 industries as unobservable, but assume that it is well approximated by a lognormal distribution. This means that our calibration procedure must come up with two parameters per industry, namely, the mean (µ i ) and variance (σ i ) of log productivity differences. Unfortunately, we do not have enough information to do so. We therefore set σ i =σ=0.5 for all industries and use the trade data to determine µ i for each industry. This assumption means that we restrict the relative productivity of goods in the 95 th percentile to be roughly 5 times that of goods in the 5 th percentile within each industry. This does not seem unreasonable.
Moreover, we find that the results are robust to sensible changes in the value of σ. 
. Inverting this probability gives: We interpret differences in average productivity as reflecting differences in human capital between the U.S. and the rest of the O.E.C.D., and measure them using data on years of total education. 15 This leads us to an estimate of the productivity-adjusted wage of 33
With this number at hand, and the assumption that σ=0.5, we use Equation (14) to obtain a set of estimates for the µ i s. The results are shown in the third column of Table 1 . There are large differences across sectors in calibrated mean relative productivities, ranging from 0.47 to 2.68. By construction, these differences in average relative productivities reflect differences across industries in exports as a share of tradeable production (reported in the second column of Table 1 ). Perhaps the most noticeable feature of column 3 is again the difference between services and the rest of the economy. Although tradeables as a fraction of services production is quite small, exports as a share of tradeables is much larger in services than in the rest of the economy (79 percent versus 30 percent). This implies that average relative productivity must be substantially higher in services than in the rest of the economy The results of this procedure are presented in the first two columns of Table 2 .
In the benchmark case of γ=1, a combination of supply shocks with a standard deviation of 2 percent and demand shocks with a standard deviation of 10 percent are required to match the cyclical properties of the trade balance. Since the U.S.
trade balance tends to decline when incomes are high, we require large demand shocks and small supply shocks in order to match the data. If γ=5, we need a smaller difference between demand and supply shocks (with standard deviations of 8 percent and 5 percent, respectively). If γ=0.5, we need a larger differences in the volatility of demand and supply shocks (with standard deviations of 17 percent and 3 percent respectively) in order to match the observed cyclical properties of the trade balance.
To understand these differences, remember that fluctuations in the terms of trade magnify (dampen) the effects of demand shocks if γ>1 (γ<1). This is why we need smaller demand shocks the larger is γ.
Results
The remaining columns of Table 2 In the benchmark case of γ=1, we find quite substantial effects of further trade integration on the volatility of the trade balance, which rises from 0.5 percent to 0.7 percent when services are half as tradeable as the rest of the economy, and to 0.9 percent when services are equally tradeable than the rest of the economy. This suggests that the main effect of trade integration on the volatility of the trade balance summarized in Result #1 is quantitatively important. On the other hand, Result #2 which qualifies our main result does not appear to be empirically very important.
Although in this example trade integration is biased towards goods in which the U.S.
has comparative advantage, we find that the quantitative effects of this bias are trivial.
To isolate the effects of this bias, we re-estimate Scenario 2, but do so under the assumption that the relative technology schedule does not change relative to the baseline scenario. In this case, we find that the standard deviation of the trade balance is 0.95%, as opposed to 0.94% when we allow for a bias in trade integration.
Finally, the rows with γ=5 and γ=0.5 show the effects of trade integration when we allow for the possibility that changes in the terms of trade also affect spending. To sum up, our empirical example suggests that the effects of trade integration on the volatility of trade balance can be substantial, with the volatility of the trade balance almost doubling in the benchmark case of log preferences.
Although in our example trade integration is biased towards goods in which the U.S.
has comparative advantage, the quantitative effects of this bias are negligible.
Departures from the assumption of log preferences do affect the quantitative effects of trade integration, with larger (smaller) increases in the volatility of the trade balance when risk aversion is low (high). However, in our calibrations the additional effects of risk aversion are never sufficiently strong to reverse our qualitative conclusion that trade integration will increase the volatility of the trade balance.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have used a simple model of trade in goods and assets to analyze the question of how trade integration affects the trade balance. We hope our contribution will induce others to explore this issue from alternative theoretical perspectives. We have motivated trade in goods and assets by postulating differences in technology and imperfectly correlated shocks. But one could for instance allow for differences in factor endowments and/or increasing returns to scale as an additional motive for trade in goods. Similarly, one might introduce differences in time preference and/or rates of return to capital as an additional motive to trade in assets. We conjecture that the main results of this paper would survive in these more general frameworks, except for extreme cases. The interesting question is whether new and realistic effects would arise that cannot be studied in our simple framework.
Finally, we hope that our contribution also provides a good theoretical grounding to empirical studies of the effects of trade integration. By isolating key theoretical channels, the model here can sharpen the interpretation of econometric studies on this subject. By providing a fully specified model, we also hope to aid in the task of developing quantitative assessments of the effects of trade integration on the trade balance. In this respect, our calibration exercise should be interpreted only as a simple illustration or example. A serious quantitative analysis of the effects of trade integration on the trade balance would be a major project on its own. (2) The first column uses shares in total production as weights; the remaining columns uses shares in tradeables production as weights. (1) To obtain the standard deviation of the trade balance as a fraction of U.S. GDP simply multiply by 2.5. 
